Anti-Catholicism has been a feature of British history from the Reformation, but it has been little studied for the period since the Second World War, and rarely using quantitative methods. A thematically-arranged aggregate analysis of around 180 opinion polls among representative samples of adults since the 1950s offers insights into developing attitudes of the British public to Catholics and the Catholic Church. AntiCatholicism against individual Catholics is found to have diminished. Negativity toward the Catholic Church and its leadership has increased, especially since the Millennium. Generic and specific explanations are offered for these trends, within the context of other manifestations of religious prejudice and other religious changes.
Introduction
As two recent collections of national case studies remind us,1 there is a long tradition of anti-Catholicism in the post-Reformation European and transatlantic worlds. Indeed, in the United States it has been claimed that the phenomenon has undergone a resurgence.2 In Britain its roots can be traced to Henry VIII's break with Rome during the 1530s and the subsequent creation of a Protestant state church. The indivisibility of church and state was protected by penal laws against the residual Catholic community, severely constraining their civil and ecclesiastical freedoms. These restrictions were only progressively removed, in a series of Catholic Relief Acts between 1778 and 1926. In turn, this institutionalized discrimination bred numerous popular tropes, Catholicism being perceived as authoritarian, superstitious, and subversive of national liberty and sovereignty. These tropes found expression in diverse ways at different times, on a spectrum ranging from subtle prejudice to outright violence. Catholicism's association with "foreignness" was reinforced from the 1780s when large-scale immigration from Ireland transformed the indigenous flock out of all recognition, albeit it never succeeded in growing the proportion of self-professed Catholics to much more than one-tenth of the overall British population, such were the effects of losses through inter-marriage, conversion, and lapsation. Another injection of foreign blood has come more recently, with immigration to Britain from Eastern European countries following their accession to the European Union. The academic literature of British anti-Catholicism is extensive, the online Bibliography of British and Irish History currently producing 867 hits for a search under "anti-Catholicism" alone, of which 390 publications have appeared since the Millennium.3 In terms of monographs, we now have good general surveys for the early modern period,4 the eighteenth century,5 andespecially -the nineteenth century.6 There is much less by way of overview, journal of religion in europe 7 (2014) 116-149 This article seeks to advance our understanding of British anti-Catholicism in two respects, chronologically and methodologically. It concentrates on the period since the Second World War, which has been little studied, apart from Scotland, and it extends the evidence base from qualitative to quantitative sources. Specifically, it investigates public attitudes to Catholics and the Catholic Church from the 1950s as reflected in opinion polls, representative of the adult population of Britain or various sub-populations. Around 180 surveys are drawn upon, a handful multinational, thus permitting a limited comparative perspective. Most have not been analysed in aggregate before.11 Ten polls of Catholics have also been consulted, albeit they shed little light on selfperceived and self-experienced discrimination. All these studies have been identified from British Religion in Numbers, whose source database provides methodological and bibliographical information for each survey; in-text references are confined to noting fieldwork date and agency.12 Our review commences with a consideration of public perceptions of Catholics as individuals, but the bulk of the analysis relates to attitudes to the Catholic Church, its teachings, and leaders, including the papal visits to Britain in 1982 and 2010. A summative assessment is then offered of how pervasive anti-Catholicism is in contemporary Britain, as reflected in the polls, with potential reasons advanced for the findings.
Attitudes to Catholics
Attitudes to Catholics were first measured in Gallup polls in the late 1950s and 1960s. In February 1957 respondents were asked whether they had "a dislike for any particular denomination or creed". The majority (76 percent) did not, but 17 percent owned up to a dislike of the Catholic faith. By December 1961 13 percent of Britons admitted to having a poor or very poor opinion of Catholics, with 15 percent in December 1967; most (70 and 71 percent respectively) held positive attitudes. Antipathy to Catholics ran at about the same level as against Jews but was much lower than to some foreigners (notably Germans and Russians in 1961, and French and Chinese in 1967) . A larger number (31 percent) in August 1959 felt Catholics wielded more power than they should but this had fallen to 20 percent by June 1969, as happened also After these initial investigations, polling interest in measuring the extent of religious prejudice in Britain waned until after the Millennium, by which time the Labour government's equality legislation was being extended to Table 1 Attitudes to inter-group marriage, Great Britain, 1968-93 (percentages) , among those sensing increased religious discrimination, nine-tenths identified Muslims as the group experiencing it, whereas no more than 4 percent thought Catholics were targets. Indeed, Christians as a whole were more likely to be seen as subject to discrimination, by one-tenth of citizens, these years witnessing the alleged development of Christianophobia in Britain.
Catholics also fared well in the British Social Attitudes (bsa) feeling thermometer of June-November 2008. Respondents were invited to rate groups on a scale, where scores of 0-49 were cool, 50 neutral, and 51-100 warm. Protestants achieved the highest proportion of warm scores (47 percent), closely followed by Catholics (45 per cent), while Muslims only secured 23 percent and deeply religious people 27 percent. Catholics had 9 percent cool ratings, marginally more than Protestants (6 percent) but significantly less than deeply religious people (29 percent) and Muslims (34 percent). The mean score for Catholics was 61, against 63 for Protestants, 60 for non-religious people, 57 for Jews, 56 for Buddhists, 50 for deeply religious people, and 47 for Muslims.14 bsa also enquired about close friendships, 53 percent claiming Catholic friends. This was lower than friendships with non-religious persons (84 percent) or Protestants (81 percent), not unexpectedly given these groups are more numerous than Catholics. In the Pew Global Attitudes Project for September 2009 Catholics were given a favourable rating by 84 percent, ahead of Jews (81 percent), Hindus (69 percent), and Muslims (61 percent); just 5 percent viewed Catholics unfavourably. The foregoing Britain-wide data can be supplemented by examination of polls for Scotland where, as already noted, sectarianism has been a particular issue. The first question posed on the subject was by System Three in August 1976, when 58 percent of Scots (60 percent of Protestants and 55 percent of Catholics) denied that religious differences were a serious problem in Scotland, 38 percent saying they were. The finding is broadly confirmed by a series of six British Election Studies (bes) or Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (ssas) from 1979 to 2003 (table 2) , apart from a spike in 1999 when 50 percent of Scots agreed Protestant-Catholic conflict was very or fairly serious. This was the year of MacMillan's "Scotland's Shame" lecture, with whose central message (there was deep-rooted anti-Catholicism in Scottish society) 45 percent disagreed and 34 percent agreed (System Three, August-September 1999). An icm poll in February 1998 had also reported 55 percent of Scots thinking sectarianism a big problem in Scotland, and 34 percent a small problem, although the focus was football-related, the context being the "Old Firm" rivalry of Glasgow's two professional football clubs, Rangers (with predominantly Protestant supporters) and Celtic (mainly Catholic). Glasgow was the heartland of Scottish Catholicism, and nfo's poll of adults in the city in 2002 found evidence of sectarianism, two-thirds confirming its existence. However, three-quarters considered it was aimed equally at Protestants and Catholics, and 48 percent agreed it was almost entirely confined to football. Catholics were not perceived to be that much more likely than Protestants to be victims of a great deal or some sectarian prejudice (59 compared with 55 percent), and there was an equal majority desire to see the banning of both Protestant and Catholic sectarian songs and street parades. It was a similar story nationally in the June-November 2001 ssas, with a fairly small difference between those perceiving employment discrimination against Catholics (30 percent) as Protestants (24 percent). Table 2 Perceived seriousness of Protestant/Catholic conflict, Scotland, 1979 -2003 The year 1999 had seen the creation of a devolved Scottish Parliament, and it is possible that the spike in sectarian angst at that point reflected either a fear that devolution would exacerbate sectarianism (the subject of a Gallup poll in April-May 1996, albeit 60 percent of Scots then discounted that possibility); or an expectation that the new legislature would tackle sectarianism. Certainly, 72 percent of Scots interviewed by nfo in January-February 2003 wanted the Scottish government to introduce laws to tackle sectarianism (which 68 percent still regarded as a very serious or serious problem), even though 64 percent doubted it could be eradicated. Support for legislation, and assessment of the problem's seriousness, was somewhat greater among Catholics than Protestants, the former also being more likely to report they had experienced sectarian abuse (30 percent, against 8 percent of Protestants). The Scottish Parliament was certainly engaging with the issue by this time, so much so that 18 percent felt it was too concerned about sectarian divisions (ssas, May-November 2003 Table 3 Attitudes to Anglican/Nonconformist and Catholic/Protestant unity negotiations, Great Britain, 1949-82 (percentages) (40 percent), and its treatment of women in parishes (35 percent); approval stood at a mere 6 or 7 percent. The British public has also taken issue with the Catholic Church's stance on personal morality, 72 percent regarding the Church as intolerant and judgmental (Populus, September 2010). Contraception was an early bone of contention, Gallup reporting in February-March 1965 that 69 percent of adults believed it would be progress if the Church was to accept birth control, and 40 percent anticipating they would look more favourably on the Church if it did so. But hopes were dashed by Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), reaffirming rejection of most forms of birth control in face of "the Pill". Polling in August 1968 revealed Britons' overwhelming opposition to the encyclical, 87 percent contending that decisions about contraception were for married couples and not the Church (Gallup), 81 percent disapproving of the papal ban (nop), 60 percent expecting it to damage the Church's standing (Gallup), 59 percent recommending Catholics ignore the Pope's instructions (Gallup), and 51 percent expecting the encyclical to reduce chances of Christian unity (nop). In fact, British Catholics were none too pleased with the Pope either, two-thirds recognizing there were good reasons for recourse to contraception within marriage (Gallup, March 1967); and one-half openly critical of the encyclical, with three-fifths expecting Catholics who had been using birth control to continue doing so (Opinion Research Centre, July-August 1968). Of recent years, the Church's public credibility has been severely tested in relation to its negativity toward same-sex relationships, at precisely the same time as popular attitudes to them were liberalizing fast.15 Cardinal Thomas Winning, leader of the Scottish Catholics, once famously described homosexuality as a "perversion", to the disapproval of three-fifths of his compatriots (mori, January 2000). In Britain 70 percent wanted the Church to abandon its rejection of homosexual practice as sinful, and 59 percent its opposition to adoption by same-sex couples (Populus, September 2010). Nevertheless, the Church was not without public sympathy in the dispute surrounding the implications for Catholic adoption agencies of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007. Many (63 percent according to icm in February 2007) felt the Labour Government wrong to stop churches from determining their own policies on same-sex adoption, and there was significant support in January 2007 for an exemption from the Regulations for them (55 percent according to Populus and 42 percent to YouGov). Churchgoers were particularly vociferous (85 percent) in branding the Regulations an infringement of the right of 16 This is a relatively rare example of an opinion poll in Britain including an explicit question about the religious dimensions of "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland. When violence in the province broke out, Britons assigned blame for it to both Protestants and Catholics, albeit slightly more to the latter than the former (Gallup, September 1969 , AugustSeptember 1970 , June 1971 . However, they were also rather more likely to say that Catholics had a more justifiable grievance than Protestants, although it was a minority in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1996 . This series revealed that both Northern Irish Protestants and Catholics were seen as victims of prejudice (rather more so for Catholics than Protestants). There was virtual unanimity among Britons on the need for the two communities to integrate, and, notwithstanding a feeling that religion would always be a divisive factor in Northern Ireland, there was a sense that Protestant-Catholic relations were improving by 1995-96 (http://www .britsocat.com/, accessed 15 March 2014). Most Britons (58 percent) were also clear that, in any political decisions taken with regard to the future of Northern Ireland, the views of the majority Protestant population should not be allowed to outweigh those of the minority Catholic community (mori, January-February 1997).
The following decade, towards the end of a long period of Conservative administrations, the Church prompted controversy with The Common Good, in which it outlined principles to inform how electors vote at the next general election. Among those aware of the document, 48 percent assessed it was suggesting people should vote Labour, and 61 percent judged it inappropriate for the Catholic bishops to have released it (Gallup, October-November 1996) . Somewhat ironically, Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the Labour Government returned in 1997, later found the public siding with the Pope and Catholic leaders in rejecting his argument of a "moral case" for a war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (two YouGov polls in February 2003). Benedict XVI's political interventions were not welcome to a plurality of Britons (ComRes, August 2010). By February-March 2013, few Britons (19 percent) believed their politicians ought to have taken any appreciable notice of the views of the Pope and Catholic bishops, and even fewer (9 percent) that they had actually paid much attention to them. Scandinavian countries were still less sympathetic to the Catholic Church in this regard, although Germany (from whence Benedict XVI hailed) took a more positive line (table 4). The British position is not necessarily to be seen as evidence of anti-Catholicism, being symptomatic of a more general desire, reflected in several polls over the years, to keep religion and politics separate. Sometimes this was not feasible, and public attitudes to two such topics -state-funded faith schools and the royal line of succession -merit in-depth treatment.
The state was a late entrant to the provision of public education in Britain. Schools were initially private or charitable enterprises, but the nineteenth century witnessed enormous investment by the Churches (especially Anglican and Catholic) in mass elementary education. When a national framework was created, and extended through the Education Act 1944 in England and Wales, these church schools were mostly assimilated into the state-run system, thereby becoming eligible for public funding while being allowed to retain their distinctive Christian ethos. At first, these church schools did not excite controversy. Indeed, when Gallup asked in May 1959 whether local authorities should increase grants paid to such schools, more than one-third agreed, with no differentiation made between schools run by the Church of England, Catholic Church, or Nonconformist Churches. In time, opposition to what have latterly become known as faith schools emerged, initially through concerns about the socially divisive effects of educating Protestant and Catholic children separately, prompted by perceived ill consequences of lack of integrated education in Northern Ireland (Public Attitude Surveys, June 1989). Subsequently, objections to faith schools were raised on secularist grounds. In polls by icm in November 2001 and bsa in June-November 2007 one-third of the public disagreed with the principle of state funding of faith schools, and by June 2013 (YouGov) it was 45 percent. Only 32 percent in the last enquiry supported faith schools in general, although there was above-average backing for Christian schools, with much less enthusiasm for non-Christian schools, especially Islamic ones (opposed by three-fifths). Nevertheless, approval of all specific types of state-funded faith school had significantly reduced since 2001, in the case of Catholic schools from 48 to 36 percent (57 to 42 percent Scotland." Moreover, for surveys where opinion was disaggregated by religion, while Catholics were inevitably more favourable to state-funded Catholic schools than other faiths (and certainly far more than those espousing no religion), very many Catholics were also opposed to their own schools. As early as August 1976, System Three recorded 69 percent of Scottish Catholics against separate schools for different religious groups, with 59 percent in the JuneNovember 2001 ssas wanting separate schools for Catholics phased out. The only Scottish polls to reveal a more even division of opinion both explicitly disconnected the existence of Catholic schools from their position in the state system. The first, by nfo in April-May 2002, was commissioned by the Scottish Catholic Church and enquired into the importance of Catholic schools being available to Catholic parents to send their children to, if they wished; predictably, the "threat to religious liberty" tone of the question elicited 52 percent of Scots replying "important" and 40 percent "not important". The other study, in January 2003 and also by nfo, was still more alarmist, asking whether Scottish Catholic schools should be abolished, 48 percent responding in the affirmative and 42 percent in the negative. (icm) . However, an earlier survey by mori in January 1990 and two later ones by YouGov in April and October 2011 registered only pluralities (around 45 percent) for a Catholic king or queen, one-third being opposed. Since any lifting of the ban on a Catholic acceding to the throne has been ruled out by the Succession to the Crown Act 2013, and the Roman Catholic Church is not pressing for change in any case, this matter must also be regarded as settled for the longer term, and further opinion polling about it in the immediate future seems unlikely.
Attitudes to Pope John Paul II and his visit in 1982
John The 1982 visit was intensely scrutinized by Gallup, who conducted 10 polls, seven beforehand and three afterwards. Approval of the visit before it took place was relatively high (table 6), although it dipped somewhat in late April and early May when the war between Britain and Argentina (a largely Catholic nation) for control of the Falkland Islands entered its darkest phase. Indeed, at one stage it was mooted by Cardinal Hume (following a crisis trip to Rome) that the papal visit would have to be cancelled, although 63 percent of the public remained convinced it should go ahead (Gallup, May 1982) . Approval of the visit was naturally highest among Catholics (averaging around four-fifths) and regular churchgoers (about threefifths), but was otherwise reasonably broadly based, with even significant minorities of those professing no religion and never attending religious services in favour. Outright disapproval of the visit never exceeded one in six, with only 7 percent sympathetic to protests against the Pope taking place during the visit and 80 percent opposed (Gallup, April 1982) . The visit was generally deemed successful, reflected in approval shooting up to 63 percent in the immediate aftermath of the Pope's departure, and still on 54 percent five months later. In Leeds metropolitan district post-visit (September-October 1982) approval reached 73 percent.
Interest in the papal visit ran at a lower level than approval (table 7) . The number claiming to be very or quite interested in the visit was mostly around one-third before the Pope arrived, dropping to 29 percent at one point, but it climbed to 56 percent after he returned home, suggesting a lot of people had been won over during the visit. There was a corresponding reduction in those saying they had limited or no interest in the visit, from two-thirds beforehand to 43/44 percent afterwards. According to Gallup, direct participation in the visit, by attending masses or other events or lining the streets to watch the Pope pass, was lower still, 4 percent claiming to have done so when questioned after the visit. Nevertheless, about half the population intended to engage with the visit in some way, and just one-quarter said they failed to do so in the two post-visit polls. As with his pontificate, so Benedict XVI's papal visit got off to a shaky start. It was overshadowed by the deepening international controversy surrounding the sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests, to which we will return. Domestically, there were rows about the cost of the visit and who should bear them, a majority of Britons believing public money should not be spent on it (ComRes, August 2010; Populus, September 2010), and even 44 percent of Catholics deeming it inappropriate for taxpayers to be part-footing the bill (YouGov, August-September 2010). Then Cardinal Walter Kasper likened England to a "third-world country" where "aggressive neo-atheism is widespread." Kasper withdrew from the papal entourage for the visit, but the damage was done, and few Britons agreed with his remarks, 16 percent about the third-world country and 23 percent about aggressive neo-atheism (YouGov, September 2010). Finally, there was a distraction during the visit itself, when six men were arrested in an alleged terror attempt against the Pope, although, according to Angus Reid Public Opinion (arpo, September 2010), only 22 percent of adults were convinced the threat was real, with 44 percent unsure.
In consequence of these factors, approval for, and interest and participation in, the visit were all at a lower level than in 1982, except for Catholics, who were generally enthusiastic. The highest approval score for adults overall was recorded by mori (25 percent September 2010).19 Although there was 92 percent exposure to the visit through the media, principally television, few afterwards expected it to make much difference to their own lives, about one in ten (disproportionately Catholic) claiming to be spiritually reenergized (orb, September 2010). Notwithstanding, the visit modestly uplifted Benedict XVI's own reputation, 15 percent of Britons noting their views of him had become more positive as a result, albeit 9 percent had become more negative (YouGov, September 2010). orb's post-visit papal favourability score in late September 2010 was 33 percent, 11 points more than before the visit, but it had slipped back to 24 percent by September 2011, when 42 percent regarded the Pope unfavourably. Assessment of Benedict XVI's leadership qualities also improved by 4 to 9 percent for each of six measures, although his highest excellent or good rating (as spiritual leader) was still no more than 32 percent (with 14 percent as world leader). Additionally, in both September 2010 and September 2011 orb found a fair degree of public agreement with several key messages delivered by the Pope during his visit, notably suggestions that children should beware of modelling themselves on sports or entertainment stars (75 percent agreement in September 2010), and religious people should not be forced to keep their beliefs to themselves out of political correctness (71 percent). Overall, however, just 31 percent of Britons deemed the visit successful and 21 per cent concurred the Pope had correctly addressed the serious problems facing British society during his visit (ComRes, December 2010). Churchgoers were more upbeat, almost two-thirds judging the visit a success and adequately confronting social problems, their views doubtless swayed by their 93 percent agreement with the Pope that religion, particularly Christianity, was being marginalized in Britain (ComRes, November-December 2010).
One of the messages Benedict XVI had sought to communicate was that the Catholic Church was ashamed and would make reparations for the suffering of innocent victims of child sex abuse by priests. The issue had surfaced in opinion polling terms in April 2010, five months before the papal visit, when three surveys first revealed the depth of public anger with Church and Pope about their handling of the matter. Harris discovered 81 percent of Britons were aware of the abuse allegations, 75 percent of whom considered they demonstrated the Church had lost its moral credibility (the biggest proportion among the six nations investigated, Germany excepted), with 45 percent calling for the Pope's immediate resignation (a figure exceeded only in Spain). YouGov explored public reaction to the revelation that, long before he became Pope, in 1985, Benedict XVI delayed plans to defrock a Californian priest with a criminal record of sexual molestation of children, for "the good of the universal church." His action was condemned by 91 percent of adults, with 79 percent support for the withdrawal of immunity from arrest for the Pope when he visited the United Kingdom. Populus reported that 87 percent demanded the resignation of any senior figure in the Church implicated in covering up abuse, 78 percent required a full Church apology to the affected children, and 65 percent disagreed the Church's response to the scandal had been appropriate.
If anything, public anger over child abuse intensified during the summer, and it was a significant factor in depressing the success of the papal visit. The problem was thought to exist on a vast scale, 21 percent telling arpo in September 2010 that the scandal affected practically the entire Catholic Church and a further 27 percent about half the Church; over the previous five decades 56 percent estimated more than one in ten priests had perpetrated child sexual abuse. The Church was widely criticized for its handling of the matter, 83 percent accusing it of dishonesty (Populus, September 2010), 80 percent of giving insufficient assistance to victims (arpo, September 2010), and 74 percent of a lack of remorse (ComRes, September 2010). More than four-fifths in September 2010 (arpo) called for greater material support for victims and for the Church to notify relevant authorities of the names of all priests accused of child sexual abuse. The Pope was largely held responsible for these failings. On the very eve of his visit (ComRes, September 2010), 77 percent accused him of not doing enough to punish child-abusing priests, and 24 percent sought his resignation. Benedict XVI's initial refusal to offer a public apology was attacked; threequarters wanted him to do so (YouGov, September 2010; orb, September 2010) . Post-visit only a minority (43 percent) held the apology he made during his visit was sincere (arpo, September 2010), while three-fifths were dissatisfied with it (orb, September 2010). Again, post-visit, the Pope was still seen by 58 percent as having mishandled the crisis (arpo, September 2010), with half unconvinced the right steps were being taken to avoid repetition (orb, September 2010). Although Catholics tended to take a more charitable line than others about Benedict XVI's involvement, they were mostly as shocked as the rest of the country about the abuse priests had undertaken. Two-thirds of Catholics acknowledged the Vatican had tried to cover matters up and been rightly criticized for it (YouGov, August-September 2010), while 52 percent admitted their faith in the Church's leadership had been shaken by the scale of abuse and the Church's response (ComRes, September 2010) .
Two and a half years after the visit, Benedict XVI was still shackled by child sexual abuse. In March 2013 (YouGov) 79 percent of Britons (including 62 percent of Catholics) were clear the Church had dealt badly with the situation. By then, the Pope had resigned, worn down by that scandal, strife at the heart of the Curia, and ill-health. In February-March 2013 most Britons (68 percent, among them 79 percent of Catholics) felt he had been right to go, although not as many as in the Pope's German homeland (82 percent). The same sevennation poll showed that, in all countries except Germany (where a majority considered Benedict XVI had done well during his eight-year pontificate), the plurality could not assess his achievements (table 9) . In Britain, perhaps surprisingly (given the surveys on child abuse), more said he had done well (36 percent overall, 72 percent among Catholics) than badly (23 percent) . There was similar indecision everywhere except Germany in evaluating how conservative or radical the Pope had been in dealing with three sets of issues (table 10) . In Britain, among those with views, the judgment was he had been too conservative in all three departments, particularly on moral issues, where Catholics (53 percent) were even more likely than average (47 percent) to say so.
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Attitudes to Pope Francis I
When it came to the election of a new Pope, many Britons in March 2013 (ComRes) felt there was scope for modernizing the process (50 percent), injecting greater transparency (56 percent), and setting an upper age limit (58 percent). There was some willingness to contemplate a non-European Pope (ComRes, February 2013; YouGov, February-March 2013; ComRes, March 2013) , and only 5 percent deemed it wrong for a South American to be appointed (YouGov, March 2013) . Overwhelmingly (80 percent) Britons recognized the new Pope had to improve the Church's reputation, with the single most important issue to resolve (mentioned by 47 percent) being child abuse Four months later (arpo, March 2014), after a year at the helm, the proportion in Britain with a positive overall view of Pope Francis remained stuck at 36 percent, whereas in the United States and Canada it was three-fifths. Omitting practising Catholics (92 percent of whom were positive), the British figure fell to 31 percent; the majority of Britons (56 percent) had come to no clear view about Francis and 9 percent were negative. Only a plurality of Britons (48 percent) thought he had made a positive impact on the Catholic Church, which was 19 percent less than in Canada and 15 percent fewer than in been kept quiet by the Catholic Church over two millennia, 27 percent being convinced the Church had covered up the truth about Jesus. Indeed, such was the novel's plausibility that 46 percent of parents of 3-to 16-year-olds thought its story-line definitely or possibly originated in the Bible (YouGov, January 2014). All remaining polls of general attitudes to the Catholic Church are very contemporary. Immediately before the papal visit (orb, September 2010) just one-fifth held a favourable view of the Church and three-fifths an unfavourable one; the proportions were identical a year later (orb, September 2011). Only a plurality described the Catholic Church as a force for good in August (mori) and September 2010 (Populus), while for orb it was reduced to a minority of one-third in its pre-and post-visit polls in September 2010 and September 2011. Almost half of all adults disagreed the Church was a force for good, rising to three-fifths of those professing no religion; four-fifths of Catholics, by contrast, saw the Church as a force for good (orb). Disagreement with the proposition was similar in February 2013, with acceptance of the Church as a force for good down to 22 percent (ComRes). By June 2013 (YouGov) 28 percent judged the Catholic Church a negative force in society, twice the number who said the same about the Church of England, with merely 13 percent describing it as a positive force (and no more than 36 percent of Catholics), and 47 percent as neither. Discrimination against women and gays, child abuse, and hypocrisy were cited as the main reasons for negativity. It was much the same story when it came to YouGov rating Catholic bishops/archbishops in February-March 2013 (table 11) , 33 percent in Britain considering they played a negative role in national life, exceeded only by Germany in this seven-nation study. This score Even a majority of Catholics now seem to agree their Church is out of touch.
Discussion
In Britain as a whole, the polls do not suggest anti-Catholicism is a significant problem any longer in terms of antipathy to Catholics as individuals. Although some residual prejudice against them surfaced in Gallup surveys in the 1950s and 1960s, it seems to have all but disappeared now. Christianophobia, the sense that religious liberties of Christians overall are being curtailed, seems to have displaced anti-Catholicism as a polling priority since the Millennium. One would have to be highly creative in the use of poll data to suggest antiCatholicism at the personal level is a real force, such as the continuing celebration by 24 percent of the population (YouGov, November 2013) of Bonfire Night, commemorating the failed attempt by Catholic conspirators to blow up Parliament in 1605. Yet most of those who celebrate this seasonal event on or around 5 November will have little, if any, understanding of its historical origins, and the "guy" they will burn on their fires is as likely to be an effigy of a modern-day villain as Guy Fawkes. It is not a sufficient explanation of this change to observe, as does one leading historian of Catholicism, that "anti-Catholic feeling … declined at about the same rate as involvement with organized religion in general in society".20 The demise of animosity against Catholics as people has deeper roots, partly lying in the dilution of the nation's Protestant ethos,21 and partly in greater tolerance of "outsider" groups and respect for diversity, encouraged by a raft of equality legislation (which illiberal Christians perceive as the source of Christianophobia). Cohort replacement effects -the death of older generations brought up to see division and prejudice as normal -have clearly been at work. Anti-Semitism has likewise diminished in Britain, for similar reasons, although milder anti-Jewish stereotypes exist not far below the surface, and hostility toward Israel (for its treatment of Palestinians) has undoubtedly hardened, leading to some targeting of Jews by association (even though, theoretically, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are separable).22 By contrast, Islamophobia (to which anti-Catholicism has typological similarities)23 has emerged as a significant phenomenon, especially since 9/11 and 7/7, and shows no sign of abating.24 It also appears to be increasingly directed against Muslims rather than Islam as faith, and grounded within a domestic rather than international context.25 Islamophobia is at its weakest in Scotland, reflecting the relative paucity of Muslims there, somewhat ironically given that Scotland has long been seen as the home of sectarianism and anti-Catholicism. However, the Scottish polls and other evidence appear to suggest the perception of anti-Catholicism in Scotland is greater than its reality, with football rivalries in Glasgow its diminishing centrepiece. Interestingly, where sectarianism is thought to occur, it is almost as much directed against Scottish Protestants as Catholics.
However, if attitudes to Catholics have almost certainly improved, opinions of the Catholic Church have undoubtedly worsened since the 1960s, particularly after the Millennium, to such an extent the majority of Britons now view it unfavourably and as out of touch. Two papal visits, in 1982 and 2010, have done nothing to halt this process. This erosion of corporate status is attributable to several causes, one being the progressive secularization of British society, manifest in the growing rejection of formal religious allegiance. Depending upon question-wording, one-quarter to one-half of Britons currently profess no faith.26 At the very least, this will translate into indifference or scepticism toward institutional religion and, for a secularist hard core, antagonism.27 The rise of the "nones"28 has created an impetus for the privatization of religion, to drive it out of the public square; the growing concerns about the existence of state-funded faith schools, Catholic or otherwise, need to be seen against this backdrop. In parallel, there has been a significant loss of public esteem for Church and clergy generally in Britain since the 1960s, with the Catholic experience by no means unique (the Church of England has also been adversely affected).29 This exemplifies how secularization can be understood (following Mark Chaves) as declining religious authority. 30 At the same time, specific policies and practices of the Catholic Church have caused outrage, including its authoritarian and traditional approach to personal morality (on issues such as abortion, contraception, and homosexuality), which conflicts with a rapidly liberalizing climate in society as a whole.31 Moreover, it is contested by very many Catholics under 60, who equally espouse moral liberalism and individualism, putting them at odds with a Vatican-style model of "faithful Catholics".32 The depth of Catholic hostility to official Catholic teaching on personal morality was exposed in the debate surrounding, and the replies to, the questionnaire issued by the Vatican in November 2013 in preparation for the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops on the Family, to be held in October 2014. The Church is also perceived, by Catholics and non-Catholics alike, to fall well short of modern expectations of gender equality. But the single issue which has inflicted most damage on the Church's reputation, almost as much with Catholics as for society at large, has been the revelation of sexual abuse of children at the hands of priests and the apparent inability of the ecclesiastical authorities to deal with its investigation and eradication. Perhaps it is not too much to suggest that the Roman Catholic Church, in Britain and worldwide, has suffered brand collapse. Whether the cult of personality, the replacement of Benedict XVI by Francis I as Pope, will reverse the considerable negativity which exists, even among Catholics, is a moot point. Why should the "Francis effect" be any more long-lasting than the fabled "Benedict bounce"? For what Britons interviewed in opinion polls have been rejecting and challenging, de facto (although they would not articulate it in this way), is the Magisterium of the Church. Some Catholic loyalists will doubtless interpret this rejection and challenge as yet another manifestation of antiCatholicism, a revival of the persecuted Church of old. Yet it would seem extreme to regard criticism of the Catholic Church in Britain, which is part of a wider religious trend (the diminishing authority of Church and clergy and the Bible)33 and which is widely shared by Catholics, as motivated by antiCatholicism as a discrete phenomenon and in any meaningful sense of the term. Apart from the fact that a Catholic cannot accede to the throne, an historical legacy in which even the Catholic Church appears to acquiesce, there is now little institutionalized anti-Catholicism in Britain. The Catholic Church may be on the back foot in the country, but latterly it is not anti-Catholicism which has put it there. For some time now, at least according to the polls, the ghost of "No Popery" has decidedly been more about apparition than substance.
